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 TIMOFEY AGARIN
Changes in the Narratives of Europeanization.
Reviewing the Impact of the Union before the Crisis
The original idea for this special issue of Südosteuropa was mooted back in the 
summer of 2014, when the fi rst fi ssures began to appear in the approach of the 
European Union (EU) towards its candidate countries in the Balkans. Over the 
time we have been soliciting, then working on the papers and going through 
the revision process, many events took place in the EU, its candidate countries, 
and in the neighbourhood. The political crisis in Ukraine has turned into full-
scale civil war; anxieties over the prospect of entry into the European Union 
have given space to pessimism about the general prospects of the once indivis-
ible EU; talk of new rounds of accession has gradually 
become more and more muted. Also, the referendum on 
the UK’s membership in the EU has raised the spectre 
of other member-states turning their backs on the EU’s 
closer geopolitical and economic integration. And, most 
recently, the foiled coup d’état in Turkey has been taken 
as a mandate for a top-down reshaping of domestic in-
stitutions in that country, with consequences that remain 
uncertain. All these political developments question 
the role and indeed the ability of the EU to bring about 
change in its member, candidate, and neighbouring 
states that would meet the expectations of these countries’ citizenries. What is 
more, these changes in the political dynamics across the wider Europe urge us 
to rethink our expectations of the Europeanization process, about its implica-
tions for its member and candidate states, and not least about the very basis of 
the normative framework undergirding the EU. 
Two years ago, my fellow authors and I were already pessimistic about the 
timeline for the Western Balkan states’ accession to the EU. At that time, Jean-
Claude Juncker had just spelt out that there would be no further enlargement 
during his term as the head of the EU Commission, and it seemed to many of 
our critics that we were simply toeing the line of European bureaucrats too 
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closely. Today it is clear that although EU membership is but a distant goal on 
the political horizons of many candidate states, the EU has lost much of its ap-
petite to embrace new members. Now more than ever is it important that we 
revisit our understandings of Europeanization beyond a narrow understand-
ing of it as a one-way ticket to Brussels. Indeed, the ‘carrot and stick’ approach 
has since yielded to bickering over policy priorities in the EU and its candidate 
countries. Because of domestic challenges in the founding member-states, na-
tional politicians now focus on the priorities of their domestic populations and 
stick to merely superfi cial commitments to the promotion of democracy, the 
rule of law, and freedoms in candidate states. The United Kingdom’s June 2016 
referendum vote to leave the European Union further indicates the challenging 
nature of the underlying parameters aﬀ ecting the EU’s relationships with its 
members and with candidate countries. 
The recent changes in the narrative of Europeanization and the EU’s own 
dwindling role in those states seeking EU membership point to the limits of 
our past understandings about the nature of the Europeanization process. And 
what a process it is: the earlier waves of EU enlargement have largely been seen 
as outcomes of the democratization of states, market liberalization, and a grow-
ing respect for the diversity of opinions, identities, and expectations among the 
newly accepted nations’ domestic populations. In eﬀ ect, much of the talk about 
the EU being in free fall after the Brexit vote points directly to issues dealt with 
by all the papers in this special issue: What does it mean to engage with the no-
tion of Europeanization when its pivotal agent is becoming fuzzier by the day? 
All the contributions, therefore, are not so much about countries, policies, and 
changes therein ‘as such’; rather, they are fundamentally about previous ways 
of thinking about Europe as a crisis-free area and thus also a cogent magnet 
for positive political change. While this view has been omnipresent in previous 
work on the EU’s impact on candidate countries and in the neighbourhood, 
a contemporary set of home-grown challenges calls for a fundamental revision 
of the object of such research. With so many crises exposing the EU’s lack of 
a unifi ed voice and, consequently, a common stance on matt ers ranging from 
fi nancial regulation, economic redistribution, and refugee accommodation to 
the situations in individual countries including Greece, Ukraine, and the UK, 
it appears that the issue of EU-building as a state-building project is the central 
problem. 
The fi nal revisions to the texts in this issue came in just days after the foiled 
coup d’état in Turkey, an event which underlined the impact that Europeaniza-
tion narratives exert beyond Europe’s borders. Studies focusing on Europe’s 
impact on Turkey have been grappling with many concerns since the country 
was accepted as a candidate state; some have identifi ed the change in the discus-
sion’s semantics, while others have homed in on conceptual change. But even 
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before the question of the rule of law and democratic governance in Turkey 
grabbed the headlines, events across the Western Balkans set a big question mark 
over the assumption that the Europeanization process had been the guarantor 
of peace, stability, growth, and the consolidation of democracy in the region. 
The rise of populism and of identitarian movements across all member-states 
in the wake of the fi nancial crisis of 2007, the cracks in solidarity between donor 
and receiver member-states following the Greek crisis, and concerns about the 
potential impact on refugee integration after 2015 came as a wake-up call for 
many pro-European evangelists: Can we still think that the European Union, 
in the shape that we now know it, is to be with us forever? Is it even legitimate 
to superimpose on candidate states not just a vague defi nition of Europe, but 
one which has become even more fractured, especially when many of the EU’s 
very fundamentals have now been called into question? As our issue was get-
ting more exciting by the minute, its authors and I were happy to go back to 
basics and tackle many of these scholarly challenges in this remarkable political 
climate. 
Given this context, in early August 2016 this journal’s editor and I asked the 
authors to address some of the concerns about the future of Europeanization 
that scholars and publics are likely to talk about in the near future. Some of 
these questions’ answers allowed us to pull together the diﬀ erent threads in the 
narratives of Europeanization found throughout the papers and align these with 
the challenges that Europeanization research will be facing in the medium term. 
We invite you, the reader, to see the papers collected in this special issue in 
the context of the Dossier published in volume 64, issue 3 of Südosteuropa (2016). 
Its contributions query the prospect of the EU and its capacity to eﬀ ect change 
in the Western Balkans. Erhard Busek, the former special coordinator for the 
Stability Pact, pleads that we not forfeit all that has been achieved in the region 
despite the circumstances of contemporary uncertainty; John Breuilly discusses 
the case of the UK leaving the EU and its impact on the potential re-emergence 
of aﬀ ection for the nation-state across the continent and beyond; and, in a debate 
among historians of Southeastern Europe, we fi nd incisive (though, we hope, 
inaccurate) assessments of the EU’s prospective turn away from joint agendas 
and common action plans among its member-states, despite their citizens’ ex-
pressed wish for greater cooperation on individual policies. In fact, indirectly 
these and many previous contributions published in Südosteuropa on single-case 
and issue studies underline that before seriously discussing the prospects of 
accession, European institutions want to see nation-states across the region in 
a form that is unpalatable for domestic publics and political entrepreneurs alike. 
To join ‘Europe’, Western Balkan states are expected to undertake greater, not 
less, state-building: a process that would require considerable domestic changes 
in polities, politics, and politicking. 
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To some degree, the perception of European meddling in the domestic aﬀ airs 
of ‘national homesteads’ in the candidate states also refl ects the current nescience 
of Eurosceptics. Thus it seems that Brexit and the range of other European crises 
are all part of the same story about the changing narratives of Europeanization: 
Soeren Keil, alone and in collaboration, has been writing tirelessly about the 
EU’s role in state-building across the Western Balkan region; similarly, Florian 
Bieber’s Routledge (formerly Ashgate) book series on Southeastern Europe has 
repeatedly drawn att ention to defi cits in commitments to eﬀ ective governance 
across the region.1 My own past work on Central Eastern EU member-states 
illustrates vividly that many a sensitive issue, such as minority protection for 
example, has been used to conserve rather than consolidate existing politi-
cal regimes before as well as after the 2004 enlargement.2 This special issue’s 
authors contend that diﬀ erent aspects of state-building have been the focus of 
the Europeanization process across the region, and while this process has been 
running in parallel to nation-state building, much of the scholarship to date has 
neglected the adverse eﬀ ects of crafting democratic states as nation-states. One of 
the prominent eﬀ ects of this process is what Erin Jenne and Florian Bieber refer 
to as ‘building subversive institutions’.3 This has meant that states have been 
withdrawing the provision of services to their citizens, becoming less ‘deep’4 
and resembling the ‘night watchman state’ ever more. At the same time, Western 
Balkans states have outsourced the delivery of many social services to non-state 
actors such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other international 
organisations, absolving themselves from fulfi lling numerous obligations and 
duties to their citizens.5 These processes have been extensively studied in the 
member-states which joined in the 2004 and 2007 waves of enlargement, both 
1  Soeren Keil, Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Farnham 2013.
2  Timofey Agarin / Karl Cordell, Minority Rights and Minority Protection in Europe, 
London 2016; Timofey Agarin, The Dead Weight of the Past? Institutional Change, Policy 
Dynamics and the Communist Legacy in Minority Protection, in: Karl Cordell / Timofey Aga-
rin / Alexander Osipov, eds, Institutional Legacies of Communism. Change and Continuities 
in Minority Protection, London 2013, 14-30.
3  Erin K. Jenne / Florian Bieber, Situational Nationalism. Nation-Building in the Balkans, 
Subversive Institutions and the Montenegrin Paradox, Ethnopolitics 13, no. 5 (2014), 431-460, 
DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2014.912447.
4  Solveig Richter, Two at One Blow? The EU and Its Quest for Security and Democracy 
by Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans, Democratization 19, no. 3 (2012), 507-534, 
DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2012.674360.
5  Beate Sissenich, Weak States, Weak Societies. Europe’s East-West Gap, Acta Politica 45, 
no. 1 (2010), 11-40, DOI: 10.1057/ap.2009.28.
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in terms of a ‘neoliberal turn’ in policymaking6 and with regard to the creation 
of weak states.7 
In her essay, Nevena Nancheva brings us directly to the core of dealing with 
the challenging narrative of Europeanization and calls on scholars to rethink 
the study of Europeanization in relation to the issue of minorities. She speaks 
about ‘visions’ of sovereignty, nationalism, human rights, and their connection to 
security issues as related to the ‘normative power of Europeanization’. Whereas 
in her account the structure of ‘European international society’ is pivotal for the 
eﬀ ectiveness of transnational regimes, her suggestion is to tackle—and move 
beyond—nation-state structures by putt ing policies into place that are common 
for all EU member-states. However, as the EU has lately gone backwards in this 
respect she links her refl ections on security contexts to both the refugee crisis 
(especially as regards the ‘Balkan route’) and the escalated political uncertainty 
in Macedonia. Nancheva’s paper gets straight to the point about the lack of 
commitment by international and national actors alike to Europeanization per 
se: what we see instead is a mismatch between what the EU can do and what is 
actually communicated to people on the ground in the states aﬀ ected. We well 
know that the EU can change domestic policies only if domestic institutions 
and actors are willing to accept such changes; Nancheva excellently maps the 
types of actorness and, indeed, the rationales of the actors that are acting on 
behalf of tentative ‘Europe’ in the domestic arena. 
Michael Pott er, on the other hand, writes about the ‘inconclusive’ European 
involvement in Kosovo. In discussing the issue of accession, he has identifi ed 
several stumbling blocks: the visions of a ‘Greater Albania’, the implied regional 
security threat that emerged out of nation-state building for Kosovo Albanians, 
and the complex entanglement of political entrepreneurs in the nationalizing 
project for Kosovo. While he takes on board the EU’s commitment to the multi-
ethnic character of the new state, where minorities have their rightful—and 
respected—place, his account of fl eeting commitments to non-Albanian versions 
of political processes, narratives of statehood, and, crucially, participation in 
societal processes paints a dismal picture. Precisely these links implied in the 
Kosovar narrative of state-building are prone to abuse by self-serving political 
entrepreneurs and by those interpreting the Kosovar nation-building project as 
a long-deserved process of the state’s nationalization as a part of Europeaniza-
tion. These conclusions might not be palpable for Kosovo Albanians, nor Kosovo 
6  Rachel A. Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism. International Institutions in Postcommunist 
Europe, Baltimore 2008.
7  Heiko Pleines, Weakness as Precondition of Smooth Integration? Representation Strategies 
of Functional Interest Groups from New Member States at the EU Level, Journal of European 
Integration 33, no. 4 (2011), 507-521, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2011.582286; Wim van Meurs, ed, 
Prospects and Risks Beyond EU Enlargement: Southeastern Europe. Weak States and Strong 
International Support, Opladen 2013.
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Serbs, nor indeed for many Kosovars committ ed to building an eﬀ ective state 
for all residents of the county. As such, Pott er’s paper indicates a signifi cant 
blind spot within past research: There is indeed a dearth of work on the depth 
of acquiescence to nation-building in Kosovo and its impact on the exclusion of 
minority (not only ethnic minority) voices. Those willing to engage with Pott er’s 
argument in depth are invited to consult his data-rich and insightful account of 
the descriptive representation of minority and micro-minority groups in Kosovo, 
which he provides in his doctoral work. To drill down to where his argument 
sits most uncomfortably with Europeanization and state-building narratives in 
Kosovo, the critical reader should be familiar with the enduring discourses of 
the adverse impacts of Europeanization on Kosovar state-building as found in 
the country’s daily press. 
Anastasiia Kudlenko is concerned with Bosnia, another post-confl ict state, 
and how security issues form a part of the crisis management approach to 
state-building by European actors. Her account of short-term as well as more 
‘sustainable’ measures to ensure stability in the country are all tightly linked 
to the promise of EU membership and how it has remained an elusive goal for 
some time. Kudlenko has accurately identifi ed the lack of a robust state as one 
of the major sources of instability in the country, and while her paper looks 
at only one state, this issue is omnipresent across the Western Balkan region. 
Here the EU has had to engage in state-building directly, and while there is 
now a profusion of ‘unfi nished states’ (such as Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia), 
this incomplete success is likely to become the main source of concern when 
thinking of international involvement to craft states elsewhere. The question is 
more potent today, as the likelihood of the ‘core’ European states losing interest 
in the ‘periphery’ may well only contribute to the growing fragility of the entire 
European security architecture. This—if any further evidence is needed—shows 
that European actors’ lack of credible commitment to state-building for all af-
fected residents says more about the futile nature of state-building by external 
actors per se than about progress in the case of Bosnia. Where reform receives 
no buy-in from domestic publics, as she demonstrates via the example of se-
curity sector reforms, her conclusions will remain accurate: issues larger than 
institution building are being sidelined for the sake of dealing with unconten-
tious reforms.
Niké Wentholt addresses the image of ‘Europe’ inside Europe itself, and how it 
is being projected onto the Western Balkans. She shows the strength of EU policy 
concerning the extradition of war criminals, while at the same time pointing 
out the mismatch between expectations and the reality on the ground. Wentholt 
is thoughtful in her assessment that it is the crumbling self-perception of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that shows 
partisanship. In fact, a toothless institution that neglects rights and concerns 
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in its constituent countries can hardly be expected to constrain others’ unruly 
behaviours. For the ICTY to be a success, as the paper suggests, the EU would 
need to accept the Western Balkan states as members and close the chapter on 
the ‘Balkanization’ of the region once and for all. Failing as it is to do this, the 
international community will continue to neglect the humanitarian catastrophe 
unfolding in Syria, where events in Aleppo are as dreadful as those we saw in 
Sarajevo some twenty years ago. There is no need to travel outside the EU to 
check the veracity of her argument, and though it is tempting to draw on the 
recent crisis aﬀ ecting EU member-states’ own consistency in its commitments, 
her analysis draws up a murky balance sheet of the international organisation’s 
inability either to coordinate its members’ views or to speak with a united voice 
to outsiders. 
This argument is also picked up in the text co-authored by Laura Wise and 
myself. We discuss how the smooth image of ‘stable political institutions’ that 
facilitate the running of democratic polities elsewhere is being challenged by 
actors on the ground. Kosovo seems to fulfi l all the formal prerequisites of 
a democratic state, yet its ‘hardware’ has not been in tune with the ‘software’ of 
politicking that one would expect with a smooth (i.e., linear) democratization 
towards a more European-style politics. The very prerequisites that the EU is 
supposed to bring as a package, such as political stability, a market economy, 
interethnic respect, and peace, have all somehow been stamped ‘invalid’ as 
a result of electoral bickering in Kosovo. And this predicament challenges so 
many of the existing parameters of what the scholarship has termed ‘Europe-
anization’. Our paper therefore concludes that prospects for the future impacts 
of Europeanization would need to account for not only the projections of ide-
als in politics and politicking, but also the salience of real political institutions 
installed for the use of potentially unconsolidated democratic publics, who are 
willing and ready to abuse contentious issues to achieve their narrowly defi ned 
political goals. 
Anna-Lena Hoh shows in her article that even though census-taking is one 
of the EU’s conditions for accession, the EU has underestimated the eﬀ ects of 
a population count. Although not requested by the EU, all Western Balkan 
countries have included data on ethnicity, language, and religion in their 
censuses. However, as both the enjoyment of rights and the access to political 
institutions by the citizens of Western Balkan states are often dependent upon 
their proportion in societies, census data on ethnocultural characteristics have 
become a highly volatile issue for politicking. In some cases, the collection of 
ethnocultural data has led to a politicization of the census as such: In Bosnia 
publication of the census results was severely delayed, and in Macedonia the 
data collection itself was aborted. In Croatia, another case discussed by Hoh, we 
see a strong alignment of ethnic, cultural, and religious identities in the mindsets 
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of census-takers, att ributable to the ongoing, albeit contentious, state-building 
endeavours for the majority undertaken by the Croatian ethnopolitical elites. 
In the fi nal contribution, Gözde Yilmaz and I discuss the career of the Euro-
peanization discourse by focusing on the use of the concept in past research. 
The paper makes us somewhat pessimistic about the heuristic value added 
by (some strands of) Europeanization research, largely because the scholar-
ship has been extremely eﬀ ective in focusing on the outcomes, rather than the 
processes, of Europeanization. We believe that Europeanization’s popularity 
as an analytical point of reference has resulted from a lack of epistemic clarity 
about how Europeanization works; some scholars have eﬀ ectively capitalized 
on an ontological fuzziness about what Europeanization is. Despite the overall 
pessimism in our assessment of this scholarship, we believe that more can be 
gained from an understanding of Europeanization as a peer-to-peer learning 
dynamic, as well as by a disengagement from overtly normative accounts of 
Europeanization’s unidirectional impacts on member, candidate, and neighbour-
hood states. As the Europeanization scholarship has incisively shown, all states 
wanting to join the EU must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that they 
have been ‘learning from the West’. Thus, the process of Europeanization, as 
well as the ensuing scholarship on its outcomes, treats candidate countries as 
‘takers’ rather than as active ‘shapers’ of their own institutional transformations, 
making candidate states’ ‘self-orientalization’ a prerequisite for their eventual 
EU accession. Prior scholarship still contains considerable lessons, therefore, 
on the impact of Europeanization processes on domestic political institutions, 
actors, and discourses.
All in all, the papers oﬀ er a set of narratives on what individual states in the 
Western Balkans have made of Europeanization over the past few decades: they 
clearly indicate how, across the region, the reference to European infl uence, 
rather than real European infl uence itself, has triggered some modest evolu-
tion in policy while leaving fundamental institutional change out in the cold. 
This special issue’s main contribution, therefore, is to update past work with 
considerable empirical data from the Western Balkan countries on the fl exibility 
of Europeanization’s narratives. All the contributors make clear that whereas 
the process of Europeanization is never a clear-cut, seamless, continuous, and—
crucially—irreversible, the narratives of Europeanization are fl exible enough to 
present ‘backsliding’, ‘hooliganism’, and ‘stalled Europeanization’ as positive 
experiences that states make while ‘learning from the West’.
Whereas from the point of view of Europe, Europeanization is mainly about 
state-building, political entrepreneurs systematically tailor their narratives of 
Europeanization to domestic expectations; in the Western Balkans, they have 
modelled state institutions on an image of a ‘lean’ if not an outright ‘night watch-
man’ state. Such states run greater risks of being hijacked by various powerful 
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actors: the ethnic majority (as discussed by Anna-Lena Hoh), marginalized 
ethnic minorities (Laura Wise and Timofey Agarin), citizens concerned with 
issues of security (Nevena Nancheva), ardent and uncompromising nation-
builders (Michael Pott er), uncommitt ed human rights agents (Niké Wentholt), 
and those committ ed to patronage by security forces (Anastasiia Kudlenko). All 
the papers implicitly state that state-building has been successful because it has 
been combined with the rationale of nation-state building, thus enabling the 
citizens of Western Balkan states to ‘buy into’ European concerns over the state’s 
ability to serve competing constituencies, frequently framed in ethnic terms. 
Regrett ably, all this fi ts excellently into the arguments of those Eurosceptics who 
have called for Brussels to repatriate powers to national capitals: a lean state, 
a lack of interstate solidarity, self-interested if not self-serving political elites, 
and public opinion riding the wave of short-term benefi ts but neglectful of the 
long-term impact of EU membership. 
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